Abstract
The aim of this contribution is to present an experimental study about calibration in deductive reasoning tasks. Calibration is defi ned as the empirical convergence or divergence between the objective and the subjective success. The underconfi dence bias is understood as the dominance of the former over the latter. The hypothesis of this study states that the form of the propositions presented in the experiment is critical for calibration phenomena. Affi rmative and negative propositions are distinguished in their cognitive processing. Results suggests that monotonous compound propositions are prone to underconfi dence. An heuristic approach to this phenomenon is proposed. The activation of a monotony heuristic would produce an illusion of simplicity that generates the calibration bias. These evidence is analysed in the context of the
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