Calculating Dependence: Soviet Security Guarantees and China's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

Abstract

In the early 1950s the Soviet Union reassured China that it was covered by a nuclear umbrella and did not need its own nuclear weapons, although the Soviet Union later provided extensive nuclear assistance to China. This paper applies existing theories of the credibility in international relations to examine why the Soviet extended nuclear deterrence guarantee failed to prevent China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The paper offers a theoretical framework for measuring junior alliance partners’ perceptions of changes in the credibility of security guarantees due to changes in the capabilities, interests and reputation of the superpower. It addresses a gap in the nuclear nonproliferation literature, which does not conclusively indicate whether, and if so when, security assurances are effective in preventing proliferation. According to new Chinese-language sources, Soviet violations of alliance commitments in the early 1950s persuaded Chinese leaders that they could not depend on the Soviet nuclear umbrella to protect their vital interests from US nuclear coercion.