Caesar, Caesarism, and the historians

Abstract

In I953 Professor Hermann Strassburger shocked a group of German school-teachers when he told them that Caesar was a totally isolated dictator; not a single Roman senator supported his decision to cross the Rubicon.1 The professor did not discuss Caesar's intentions, his final aims, or his role in history. Quoting Burckhardt, he said: 'To make rash guesses about a world plan leads to error because it starts from mistaken premises.' An ordinary Roman senator at the beginning of his career2 (and few can challenge Strassburger's authority on this topic), Casesar could hardly have planned the kingship during his aedilate. Indeed, most modern historians reject the statement in Suetonius that 'Casesar in his consulship established the despotism which he had in mind when he was aedile' (Julius Caesar, IX, 2).3 Such a view seems too simple to be historical. Only after his conquest of Gaul, when Caesar tried to raise his dignity to the level of Pompey, did he decide to fight. He knew exactly what he was doing. He admitted as much to his friends (among them the historian Asinius Pollio): 'My friends, to leave this stream uncrossed will breed much trouble for me. To cross it for all mankind' (Plutarch, Caesar, 32; Appian, Civil Wars, II, XXXV, 140). The prospect did not win support from his friends. That L. Calpurnius Piso (his father-in-law), P. Cornelius Dolabella, C. Scribonius Curio, S. Sulpicius Rufus, and C. Trebonius Testa did not approve of the