C.I. Lewis: Pragmatist or Reductionist?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Despite its substantial influence, there is surprisingly little agreement about how to read C.I. Lewis’s Mind and the World Order. Lewis has historically been read as a reductionist attempting to ground knowledge in qualia, but more recently it has become fashionable to read Lewis as a pragmatist engaged in a non-reductive, transcendental project. In this essay, I argue that while Lewis does have pragmatist leanings, the way he defines the fundamental categories of “the given,” “meaning,” and “concepts” ultimately commits him to a narrow reductionism. This is because he regards philosophy as an individualistic practice whose categories are verifiable only in introspection. I show how this commits Lewis to reductionism by focusing on his trouble grounding ethics and knowledge of other minds. The upshot is that while Lewis often leans towards pragmatism, his metaphysical commitments force him towards reductionism.