C. D. Broad's Leibniz

Abstract

This volume consists of C. D. Broad's posthumously published lectures on the philosophy of Leibniz which were given at Cambridge in the academic year 1948-9 and repeated, with some revisions, in 1949-50 [1]. The editor, Mr. C. Lewy, infonns us that Broad always wrote out his lectures fully beforehand and that the manuscript on Leibniz is in very good condition., So, what we have here is not a reconstructed set of notes, but apparently a reproduction of the lectures more or less as Broad gave them. In spite of the fact that it has been twenty five years since the lectures were presented (thus making it impossible for them to be completely up-to-date) they remain an extremely good introduction to Leibniz. Indeed, they are one of the very best general introductions we have. Throughout the book, Broad makes a special (and very valuable) effort to relate Leibniz's philosophical theses to his scientific views, as well as to provide the student with a summary of the main Scholastic and Cartesian views necessary for an adequate appreciation of Leibniz's thought. The book begins with a brief introductory chapter on Leibniz's life and works. This is followed by a discussion of Leibniz's general principles, including a well developed account of what Broad refers to as the Predicate-in-Notion Principle (hereafter: PNP).2 The third chapter deals with Leibniz's doctrine of corporeal substances and includes a very useful account of his dynamics. In the fourth chapter Broad takes up the theory of monads and discusses in detail Leibniz's treatment of the mind-body issue and his theory of organisms. The fifth chapter deals with Leibniz's psychology and theory of knowledge, while a brief sixth chapter treats ethics. The book concludes with a discussion of Leibniz's theology. There is much that is suggestive in this section, particularly Broad's relatively short but genuinely insightful analysis of Leibniz's defense of God's character. The book is, on the whole, a very excellent piece of work. To praise the book in this way, however, is not to suggest that it is without defects. One of Broad's most important claims, for example, is to have shown that PNP is compatible with contingency. He argues for this on the basis of two conditions which he believes are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a sentence to express a necessary truth. Broad's