Buying Voters: Money and Political Transaction in Legislative Elections.

M Iqbal Fardian

doi:10.19184/csi.v1i1.21508

Abstract

Political transaction has become a common phenomenon that accompanies elections. It does not only occur in countries with well-established democratic systems, but also in developing nations. Academic engagement with the concept of democracy increasingly explores its links to the chaotic commodification of electors' votes. Political transactions can trigger several problems, such as political structures, citizenship awareness, or cultural relations issues that form a democratic structure of the country. Political transactions are processes of negotiation that take place between elites. This paper explores the contestation of social positions to gain electors' votes in the context of the legislative election conducted in Banyuwangi. The strategies used by legislative candidates to obtain votes through transactional relationships demonstrates the various actors involved in general elections. First, the researcher argues that democratization has transformed the sacred position of the elites, especially the religious elite. Second, the complexity of relations between elites presents the position of a broker, which emphasizes the character of democracy in Indonesia, which is marked by issues of clientelism. Thus, it is essential to observe Indonesia's political praxis from the institutional practice point of view and its social problems that distort democratic values. Keywords: Clientelism, Transaction Cost Politic, Money Politics

Highlights

Indonesia's democratization process is marked by political reforms that took place since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, known as the Reform Era
Based on the description above, it can be seen that even though, in some cases, there was a transformation of clientelism praxis in the religious elite into the emergence of non-religious elite political brokers, clientelism remained the dominant factor accompanying the implementation of general elections in Indonesia
The limited number of political positions both in the legislative and executive branches gave birth to the practice of Money Politics, which resulted in prohibitive political costs of getting to political power

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's democratization process is marked by political reforms that took place since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, known as the Reform Era. The culture of clientalism is considered a determinant of the practice of money politics in many developing countries that have democratic parties2 This clientelism relationship is an interesting subject to study as the pattern and mechanism that is often seen as a determinant of the emergence of money politics and even corruption. Besides the patron-client culture and the weak political institutions, the emergence of prohibitive transaction cost politics rule in election for political parties indicated corruption practices. Those lead to the misuse of state and regional budgets. Rates of corruption in Indonesia demonstrates that democratization is a political process that is continuously overshadowed and undermined by corruption

The Clientelism of Kiai-Santri and General Models of Money Politics Practices

CLIENTELISM AND PRACTICAL POLITICS

THE DARK SIDE OF DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE

Conclusion