Abstract
In this article I critically examine a standard feature in conceptions of dis crimination: the group-criterion, specifically the idea that there is a limited and definable group of traits that can form the basis of discrimination. I review two types of argument for the criterion. One focuses on inherently relevant groups and relies ultimately on luck egalitarian principles; the other focuses on contextually relevant groups and relies ulti mately on the badness of outcomes. I conclude that as neither type of argument is con vincing, the criterion is morally arbitrary, and as such untenable. Finally, I suggest both some of the conceptual and some of the practical implications of abandoning the criterion.
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