Business-Government Relations in Mexico: The Case of the Sugar Industry

Abstract

Unlike many developing countries, Mexico has managed to avoid both military rule and chronic political instability. A partial, although significant, explanation for Mexico's unique record is the relationship between politics and the market. Whereas it is undoubtedly true that there has been, and continues to be, an for profits' between the government and the private sector in Mexico, the alliance is conditional rather than absolute. When its political costs become so high as to constitute a threat to the existing political order, the political elites alter the terms of the alliance by increasing their regulation of the economic activities of the private sector. To state it somewhat differently, political stability in Mexico has been maintained because of a willingness and ability on the part of political leaders to give priority to political over economic considerations in times of perceived crisis. In order to maintain the priority of the political, however, Mexican political elites have had to ensure that the state avoid becoming the captive of any class or set of organized interests in the society. The relative autonomy of the state from its social bases has therefore been a necessary condition for continued political stability in Mexico. If Mexican political elites had to respond to all the demands made upon them, or even only to those emanating from powerful economic interests, the state would lack the flexibility required to restabilize the political system in times of crisis. For this reason, even during periods of relative calm, Mexican political elites are busy creating mechanisms that can be used to regulate the behavior of their various constituencies when such regulation is deemed necessary to maintain or restore political order. Existing studies of the Mexican political system have tended to emphasize the mechanisms for state regulation and control of lower-class groups, a fact