Business Models and Incentives: For an Effects-Based Approach of Self-Preferencing?

Abstract

Self-preferencing can be defined as an envelopment strategy in which ‘the enveloper might enter the target market and, at the same time, bend the origin platform’s rules to provide a better outcome for its own products or services’.1 The relevance of the concept of self-preferencing is particularly controversial in competition law and economics. Although not referred to in the Google Shopping judgment,2 the notion of self-preferencing appears to play a significant role in the ruling, which justifies examining it in the light of Industrial Organisation (IO) literature. Conceived as a theory of competitive damage, self-preferencing may be emphasised in many cases related to the digital sector. These are ones of EU Commission Google Shopping3 and Google Android4 decisions, the proceedings against Amazon,5 the ones initiated against Apple,6 the decision of the Italian competition authority against the same company in...