Business Interests, Conservative Economists, and the Expansion of Noncontributory Pensions in Latin America

Abstract

Since the 1990s, most Latin American countries have significantly expanded noncontributory pension programs. In explaining this wave of expansion, research has focused on the protagonism of left parties and social movements and on electoral competition, generally disregarding the roles of organized business and conservative policy experts. This article demonstrates, through a detailed analysis of Chile’s 2008 noncontributory pension reform, that conservative economists played active roles in formulating a noncontributory pension policy characterized by moderate, targeted, and “incentive-compatible” benefits and financed by the general budget. The conservative design of the program facilitated broad support from employers and private pension funds, critical for the eventual passage of the reform. The analysis illustrates the need to incorporate business interests into explanations of welfare state reforms in Latin America and the broader Global South, in particular by distinguishing the interests of employers and private providers and by focusing on their interaction with conservative policy experts.