Business Entertainment Expenditure and Stock Price Crashes: The Agency Problem Perspective

Abstract

This study examines the effects of corporate entertainment expenditure on stock price crashes. From the trust-building perspective, the formation of relationships through spending on entertainment increases information transparency, increases information flow, and provides an opportunity to gain stakeholder trust, thus lowering the risk of a stock price crash. On the other hand, from the agency problem perspective, entertainment spending is related to information opacity and corporate corruption, increasing the risk of a stock price crash. We find that entertainment spending relates positively to a stock price crash, supporting the agency problem hypothesis. Social networking through entertainment expenditure increases information asymmetry and opacity between network insiders and outsiders. In addition, corporate insiders have an incentive not to disclose negative information, such as an increase in political and legal risks, while exaggerating the benefits of social networking. Consequently, the negative information hidden in the market spills out at once, leading to the stock price crash. We also find that the enactment of the Kim Young-ran Act, which affects entertainment expenses, alleviates the positive effect on the risk of a stock price crash significantly. Through these results, we confirm that the anti-graft law enhances management transparency and improves the information environments surrounding companies. Key words: Agency Problem; Corporate Entertainment Expenditure; Stock Price Crash; Governance; Social Networking JEL Classification: G34, G18