Burst Beliefs – Methodological Problems in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task and Implications for Its Use

Kristel De Groot

doi:10.36850/mr1

Abstract

Studies in the field of psychology often employ (computerized) behavioral tasks, aimed at mimicking real-world situations that elicit certain actions in participants. Such tasks are for example used to study risk propensity, a trait-like tendency towards taking or avoiding risk. One of the most popular tasks for gauging risk propensity is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), which has been shown to relate well to self-reported risk-taking and to real-world risk behaviors. However, despite its popularity and qualities, the BART has several methodological shortcomings, most of which have been reported before, but none of which are widely known. In the present paper, four such problems are explained and elaborated on: a lack of clarity as to whether decisions are characterized by uncertainty or risk; censoring of observations; confounding of risk and expected value; and poor decomposability into adaptive and maladaptive risk behavior. Furthermore, for every problem, a range of possible solutions is discussed, which overall can be divided into three categories: using a different, more informative outcome index than the standard average pump score; modifying one or more task elements; or using a different task, either an alternative risk-taking task (sequential or otherwise), or a custom-made instrument. It is important to make use of these solutions, as applying the BART without accounting for its shortcomings may lead to interpretational problems, including false-positive and false-negative results. Depending on the research aims of a given study, certain shortcomings are more pressing than others, indicating the (type of) solutions most needed. By combining solutions and openly discussing shortcomings, researchers may be able to modify the BART in such a way that it can operationalize risk propensity without substantial methodological problems.

Highlights

To a large extent, psychological science rests on the promises of operationalization: defining fuzzy concepts as measurable variables, or in other words, Received: 8 June 2020, Accepted: 31 August 2020, Published: 8 October 2020 jtrialerror.com 43DG changing conceptual variables into operational ones (Shuttleworth, 2008)
Another way is through computerized behavioral tasks, like the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al, 1994), the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al, 1999), the Game of Dice Task (Brand et al, 2005), the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al, 2002), and the more recent but already widely used Columbia Card Task (Figner et al, 2009)
The key problems that characterize the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) are 1) a lack of clarity as to whether decisions are characterized by uncertainty or risk, 2) censoring of observations, 3) confounding of risk and

Summary

Introduction

Psychological science rests on the promises of operationalization: defining fuzzy concepts as measurable variables, or in other words, Received: 8 June 2020, Accepted: 31 August 2020, Published: 8 October 2020 jtrialerror.com 43. This conjecture is supported by the observation that participants in both the original and the automatic BART on average press closer to the normative solution in the final block of 10 trials than they do in previous blocks (De Groot & van Strien, 2019; Lejuez et al, 2002).1 It corresponds with the presumed shift from deciding under uncertainty to deciding under risk. The most straightforward way to mitigate these problems may be the modified BART developed by Pleskac et al (2008), which differs from the original task in three ways It involves an automatic response mode: participants indicate their intended number of pumps at the start of each trial, after which the balloon automatically inflates to the corresponding size (or until it bursts). This will likely elicit sufficiently high pump averages, without compromising the validity of the task

Findings

Discussion

Conclusion