Abstract

Externalist accounts of the mind deny that the contents of our thoughts are type-individuated by our bodily properties. Intentional contents are said to be fixed instead by certain environmental aspects to which we are appropriately related.' In contrast, Individualistic accounts of the mind assert that content is type-individuated by features exclusive to the person's brain, body, or in the case of classical Dualism, by the immaterial mind. According to Individualists, our thought-contents are counterfactually independent of our external environment for their type-identity.2 In this paper, I shall discuss Tyler Burge's version of Externalism as applied to mental attitudes about empirical kinds.3 His version presents an interesting picture of cognitive attitudes because it blends together certain Fregean and Wittgensteinian themes. On the one hand, mental content has all the trademarks of a Fregean sense.4 On the other hand, a person's having a

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