Bureaucratic Slippage and Environmental Offset Policies: The Case of Wetland Management in Alberta

Abstract

Environmental trading programs are seen as promising tools for fostering sustainable development, yet little is know about how decision-making practices in these emerging policy spaces influence program outcomes. This study quantifies wetland compensation outcomes in Alberta, Canada, and compares these outcomes to statements made in government-issued compensation guidelines. Contrary to guideline intent, we found a strong tendency to skip over wetland avoidance in favor of compensatory payments for wetland loss; that compensation sites are frequently located outside the watershed of impact; and that distances between impact and compensation sites often exceed what is considered reasonable under the guidelines, without commensurate increases in compensation ratios. Agency capture was found to drive these implementation failures, and mechanisms producing capture in this case include overhead governance and organizational goal ambiguity. This study suggests that greater attention must be given to agency context if environmental trading programs are to be effective tools for managing environmental resources.