Abstract
This paper raises a question that is little-discussed yet central to lawmaking and policy implementation in the American separation-of-powers system: Under what institutional conditions is Congress unable to induce compliance with legislative dictates in contemporary statutory implementation? Unlike a number of existing delegation models, the paper holds that variation in institutional conict and oversight of agencies fundamentally reshape agencies’ latitude as active policymakers. I answer this question in the context of the Environmental Protection Agency from 1973-2010 using an extensive original dataset on noncompliance using the hand-coding of several thousand congressional bill introductions and several hundred DC Circuit court cases. I use these data to test the separation-ofpowers theories concerning the eects of legislative-executive conict and legislative division
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