Bureaucratic competition and provision of public goods and services: the consequences of inter-agency conflict on agricultural land conservation

Abstract

Numerous layers of federal, state, and local agencies are necessary to provide public goods and services in any country. Inter-agency cooperation and coordination are essential to provide these goods and services. However, federal agencies may have conflicting interests; and understanding the consequences of such conflict across agencies is important in designing public policy. I exploit a unique situation created by the Missouri Farm Bureau and Extension Service in the mid-20th century and show how inter-agency conflict may undermine the benefits of public services provided by the federal government. The extension services in Missouri resented the creation of a new institution, conservation districts, to provide technical assistance to the landowners. Using the spatial and temporal variation of this conflict and employing a difference-in-difference strategy with Missouri’s border states, I show that this non-cooperation led to slower growth of conservation districts and a lower amount of land conservation services across the years.