Bureaucracy and policymaking: Evidence from a choice-based conjoint analysis

Abstract

Bureaucrats are a fundamental part of the functioning of the modern state and democracies. However, there is still much disagreement about the ideal profile of bureaucrats to deliver quality and responsive policies. Bureaucrats can be meritocratically recruited or politically appointed, creating the dilemma between autonomy and accountability. This article explores this dilemma, identifying the profile of bureaucrats perceived as having the best performance in the different policymaking dimensions. The study explored the form of recruitment, the level of experience, and the bureaucrat’s gender as characteristics of interest. Using data from an original survey with high-ranking bureaucrats in Brazil, we implement conjoint analysis to identify the most valued profile. The results indicate that the bureaucrat recruited through the merit system is more valued in the dimensions of “transparency,” “evidence,” “political coordination,” and “general preference of respondents.” This result is independent of the bureaucrat’s experience, so the effect is related to the recruitment form. However, the politically appointed bureaucrat is more valued in the dimension of “effort.” Gender did not generate significant effects. The article brings experimental evidence to increase understanding of how bureaucratic autonomy and accountability connect to deliver better government performance.