Abstract

sets over the period 1916-1987. Their structured critique is consistent with the earlier work of Strong (1984), Boyd (1984), Allen, McCrickard, Cartwright and Delorme (1988), Mester (1994) and others. In general, all question the findings of Toma (1982), Shughart and Tollison (1983), Boyes, Mounts and Sowell (1988) and others, that bureaucratic effects and institutional incentives have had a significant impact on the development and conduct of monetary policy. An underlying issue in this debate is whether variables proxying bureaucratic or institutional effects emanating from the incentives contained in the structure

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.