Abstract
AbstractThis chapter is the climax of Part I of this book. It attempts to show that all the ways in which the sense-datum theory has been set up as the bogy-man in the philosophy of perception are completely misconceived. This is mainly because the classical empiricist tradition had a crude account of thought and judgement, which did not allow it to grasp the interrelation of cognition and sensation. Once this is sorted out, one does not need to impute intentionality or representation to the fundamental nature of sensation in order to preserve both our natural intuitions about the directness of perception, and the dependence of perception on the particular nature of our sensory capacities, which involves sense-data.
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