Abstract
Metamemory processes depend on different factors across the learning and memory time-scale. In the laboratory, subjects are often asked to make prospective feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments about target retrievability, or are asked to make retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) about the retrieved target. We examined distinct and shared contributors to metamemory judgments, and how they were built over time. Eye movements were monitored during a face-scene associative memory task. At test, participants viewed a studied scene, then rated their FOK that they would remember the associated face. This was followed by a forced choice recognition test and RCJs. FOK judgments were less accurate than RCJ judgments, showing that the addition of mnemonic experience can increase metacognitive accuracy over time. However, there was also evidence that the given FOK rating influenced RCJs. Turning to eye movements, initial analyses showed that higher cue fluency was related to both higher FOKs and higher RCJs. However, further analyses revealed that the effects of the scene cue on RCJs were mediated by FOKs. Turning to the target, increased viewing time and faster viewing of the correct associate related to higher FOKs, consistent with the idea that target accessibility is a basis of FOKs. In contrast, the amount of viewing directed to the chosen face, regardless of whether it was correct, predicted higher RCJs, suggesting that choice experience is a significant contributor RCJs. We also examined covariates of the change in RCJ rating from the FOK rating, and showed that increased and faster viewing of the chosen face predicted raising one’s confidence above one’s FOK. Taken together these results suggest that metamemory judgments should not be thought of only as distinct subjective experiences, but complex processes that interact and evolve as new psychological bases for subjective experience become available.
Highlights
In our day-to-day functioning, we rely both on our memory, and our knowledge of our memory, referred to as our metamemory (Nelson and Narens, 1990)
The last relevant factor that we investigated as a basis of metamemory judgments is the target recognition experience, which has been shown to influence retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) (Nelson and Narens, 1990; Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996)
As a subsequent analysis step, we examined whether specific covariates were still significant predictors of one metamemory judgment, when controlling for the other metamemory judgment (i.e., RCJs were included as a covariate in the FOK models and FOKs were included as a covariate in the RCJ models)
Summary
In our day-to-day functioning, we rely both on our memory, and our knowledge of our memory, referred to as our metamemory (Nelson and Narens, 1990). We may encounter someone on the street, and even though we cannot immediately recall his or her name, we may feel that we know it This feeling is the result of monitoring our memory. Timing of metacognition feeling-of-knowing (FOK), we may continue to rack our brains for their name, showing that the knowledge of our memory influences our behavior. Once we generate a name, we monitor and decide if we are confident enough to use that name, again showing that our knowledge of our memory influences our behavior. Participants are first presented with a cue and asked to recall the corresponding target from memory If they are unable to do so, they are asked to make a FOK judgment, followed by a recognition test. During RCJ tasks, participants are given a memory test (either recall or recognition), and subsequently asked to rate their confidence that their response is accurate
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