Abstract
ABSTRACT A growing amount of research explores how the allocation of regional development monies follows electoral reasons. Yet, the existing literature on distributive politics provides different and contrasting expectations on which geographical areas will be targeted. The paper focuses on proportional representation (PR) systems. While in such settings governments have incentives to target core districts and punish foes, it is suggested that when incumbents attempt to build a state–party image they may broaden the territorial allocation of benefits and even target opposition out-groups. The paper exploits data on Turkey's public transport investment for the period 2003–14 and in-depth interviews to provide results in support of the hypothesis.
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