Abstract

432 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE on the definition of missile accuracy. Spinardi provides a clear narra­ tive and clearly established links to this broader literature, as well as framing the book with a deft exposition of the main themes in the social construction of technology program. Readers trained as histori­ ans to write contextual accounts may doubt the essential novelty claimed for this approach, but the intelligence with which it is summa­ rized here counts as one of the real strengths of the book. Bruce Hevly Dr. Hevly is assistant professor of history at the University of Washington. His work includes studies of the development of research rockets at the Naval Research Laboratory and of plutonium production at the Hanford Works. Building Air Bases in the Negev: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Israel, 1979—1982. By Frank N. Schubert. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1992. Pp. xiii + 303; illustrations, notes, index. Both Herodotus and Thucydides wrote about Middle Eastern mili­ tary history. Herodotus based most of his work on oral history, and Thucydides’ documentation involved participant observations. Frank Schubert, a contemporary military historian, has used both of these methodologies in his three-year chronicle of a contemporary episode of Middle Eastern military history. His topic centers on the role of administrative leadership of the U.S. Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Air Force, and the Israeli Air Force in the construction of two Israeli air bases. As a result of the Camp David agreements between Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin, Israel agreed in 1978 to move out of the occupied Sinai Peninsula and restore this territory to Egypt. The United States promised to help replace Eitam and Etzion, two Israeli air bases in the Sinai that had been a key to Israel’s air superi­ ority in the Middle East. Even before planning for construction started for the new bases at Ramon and Ovda in the Negev, Lieuten­ ant GeneralJohn W. Norris assigned Frank Schubert the task to write the history of this enterprise. Schubert based his work on correspon­ dence of the principals involved, field trips to Israel, and close to one hundred interviews conducted during the 1979-82 period of fast-track construction. Like Herodotus and Thucydides, Schubert discovered that the personalities of leadership, the institutional loyal­ ties of the second-in-command, and the cultural traditions of all in­ volved were the key elements in understanding the successful out­ come of this turning point in Middle Eastern history. The book is entitled Building Air Bases in the Negev, but if one wishes to examine working drawings, review site plans, and learn of the building technology of modern air base construction, one will not find it here. One does find, however, a very interesting, if not com­ TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 433 plex, insight into administrative management. Schubert discusses in revealing detail how the Corps of Engineers aggressively planned to obtain and control the contract for the construction of these bases, how it made sure it had the power of the purse during construction, and how it set the goals and agenda to complete the work within the three-year time schedule. Problems such as diversion channels for flood control at Ovda, the need for quality control of materials, the work stoppages by imported labor, the allegations of fraud and mis­ management, the overprocurement by contractors, the presence of unexploded ordnance, and the concerns of archaeological deposits are all discussed. However, the focal dilemma Schubert describes was the power struggles between the leaders of the U.S. Air Force, the Israeli Air Force, and the Corps of Engineers. Air Force Brigadier General Paul T. Hartung was assigned to be program manager and liaison between the Corps and Israel. Rather than working out problems, Schubert believes Hartung was the protagonist for quality control. The other protagonist was Israeli Air Force Brigadier General Moshe Bar-Toy, who advocated cost containment. Both of these men served their constituencies during the whole phase of the construction event. In contrast, the Corps had a maze of leaders and Schubert should have provided a flowchart to visualize the frequent changes in...

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