Abstract
Abstract Some philosophers hold that value can be reduced to reasons: to say that something is valuable is just to say that there are reasons to respond to it in certain ways. T.M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value is a leading example of this sort of view. In the important case of the value of a person, Scanlon suggests that the relevant reasons are moral reasons. This paper argues that the value of a person cannot be understood in this reductive way. Scanlon’s approach cannot account for the value that we see in those we love, but neither can it account for the value to which we respond with moral respect. Widening the range of reasons to include reasons for attitudes does not solve the problem. The paper concludes that the value of a person is more fundamental than the reasons that we have to treat and regard her in various ways.
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