Brothers-in-arms? The Egyptian military, the Ikhwan and the revolutions of 1952 and 2011

Abstract

This article argues that examining the dynamics of interaction between the Egyptian military regime which took power in 1952 and the Muslim Brotherhood can aid our understanding of the strategic and tactical choices facing the post-Mubarak military regime and the Brotherhood following the revolution of 2011. Significant common factors at play in both periods include the shared desire of both the Brotherhood leadership and the military regime to secure the demobilisation of the popular protest movements which played a fundamental role in the destabilisation of the old regime in order to secure their own position in a post-revolutionary political order. In both cases, while the Brotherhood's ability to organise independently of the state made it a valuable potential partner for the military rulers, the state played an active role in creating opportunities for the Brotherhood to extend its influence at the expense of its rivals. However, comparison also reveals crucial differences between the two periods. Firstly, there is the very different relationship between the officers who assumed power and old regimes. The second difference is the altered relationship between the military seizure of power and popular participation in the revolution. A third area of contrast lies in the configuration of the military's tactical alliance with its civilian partners.