British Responses to Italian Non-Belligerence, September 1939–June 1940

Abstract

Abstract This article provides an assessment of the British perception of Italy’s reality during the period of non-belligerence and of British political, diplomatic, and military responses from September 1939 to June 1940. It analyses the alternative options available to British political and military officials and evaluates the decisions they took during the period under consideration. It concludes that British political and military officials accurately understood Italy’s situation and Mussolini’s desire to join the war on Germany’s side. However, they rightly reasoned that Italy’s entry into the war depended on the outcome of the Western campaign. It was only if and when that campaign had been decided that Mussolini would make his move. Given this, the choice to concentrate British forces against Germany rather than dispersing them by opening new fronts or expanding the existing battlefield was reasonable. Had the Anglo-French allies managed to repel the offensive in the West, the threat of Italy’s intervention would have been averted. It can therefore be argued that London’s decision to refrain from engaging Rome militarily was not due to a lack of awareness regarding Italy’s vulnerability, but rather to a strategic doctrine aimed at defeating Germany through a long war of attrition. This decision showcased a shrewd understanding of the prevailing situation.