British Plans for Economic Warfare against Germany 1937-1939: The Problem of Swedish Iron Ore

Abstract

Swedish iron ore occupies a special place in both the history of the first months of the Second World War, and the scholarly debate on the character of the German war economy. Schemes for diplomatic, naval or military action in Scandinavia all more or less ineffectual dominated the strategy of Britain and France in the winter of 1939-40. Though given impetus and a pretext by the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War in November 1939, these plans were principally aimed at the complete or partial denial of supplies of Swedish iron ore to Germany. German strategy too was concerned with Scandinavia partly in response to the illconcealed Allied interest in the area, but also in pursuit of broader strategic objectives. According to Hitler's directive of 1 March 1940, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, carried out on 9 April, 'would anticipate English action against Scandinavia and the Baltic, would secure our supplies of ore from Sweden, and would provide the Navy and Air Force with expanded bases for operations against England. The British preoccupation with Swedish ore was not merely due to the fact that the German steel industry was more dependent on supplies from Sweden than from any other source: this was a matter of common knowledge. It also derived from the much more questionable belief, expressed most authoritatively in a memorandum by the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) of 18 December