British Naval Policy, 1953–60: Implications for Norway and American Commitments in the North Atlantic

Abstract

In Chapter One it was observed that, even after the reorganisation of NATO’s command structure in 1951, the British COS as a collective body showed little interest in reassessing the place of Norway in its defence priorities. By late 1951 and early 1952, however, such lack of interest no longer applied to all three services. In the early 1950s, Admiralty thinking — specifically as it applied to the employment of the Fleet Air Arm — evolved in a manner which again led to an emphasis on the importance of Norway and its contiguous seas in British naval policy. This chapter addresses three issues. First, it looks at the principal reasons — strategic, political, and bureaucratic — for the resurgence of the Royal Navy’s interest in Norway before the 1957 Defence Review. Second, it examines the impact of Sandys’s Defence Review on British naval policy, looking in particular at the American reactions to the changes in the Royal Navy’s NATO commitment. Finally, it explores some of the additional factors which, in 1957–58, further increased Norway’s importance in US maritime strategy.