Abstract
This paper examines the development of British naval aviation in the period 1908 to 1914 in the light of modern theories of military innovation. The case is of particular interest because it took place in peacetime in a force which had enjoyed global supremacy for a century, strong contra-indications of the inclination and the capacity for organisational change. The case study examines the development of British naval aviation along two dimensions of innovation: strategy and technology. The analytical tools are the four schools of ‘Military Innovation Theory’ as identified by Grissom. The evidence is derived from the relatively limited body of secondary material and the archives of the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and the Cabinet. The evidence from these sources seems to indicate that what Grissom refers to as the ‘civil military’ theory is the most persuasive. This theory was originated by Posen in 1984 and relies heavily on neo-realist approaches to international relations. It holds that while the default position of the military is conservative, the international environment generates challenges which prompt political leaders to insist the military respond. The decisions of the Liberal Government, and especially of Churchill from 1911, seem to reflect this position. The other theory which offers some purchase is the ‘cultural’ theory which Grissom associates with Theo Farrell. In this theory the behaviour of the military is determined by values and traditions. In the case of the Royal Navy, the officer corps was technically oriented as a result of education and experience and this facilitated the development of naval aviation. The paper demonstrates that by itself, naval technical competence would not have brought the naval air service to the relatively high level it had attained by August 1914. That required the intervention of the civil authorities responding in the fashion prescribed by the civil military theory. Culture was facilitative but the neo-realist processes were determinative.
Highlights
This paper examines the development of British naval aviation in the period 1908 to 1914 in the light of modern theories of military innovation
Military Innovation Theory has evolved in recent years as a branch of military history in response to the perception that change in the military field is accelerating and capacity to innovate is crucial to military effectiveness
That development should be instructive in the context of Military Innovation Theory in that the Royal Navy at the time both technically and strategically was built around large surface ships
Summary
To the man in the street, with a healthy scepticism about all things official, the expression ‘military innovation’ is a contradiction in terms. While the war time activities of the armed services have been intensively studied the peacetime preparations have attracted less attention If it is true, as Layman concluded from his researches, ‘...that the development of naval aviation during the First World War had never been adequately explored’, again the period up to the War was even more neglected.[24] Histories of aviation, or of the Royal Navy or of the First World War generally start with the airship, note Samson’s take off from HMS Africa in 1911, and conclude with a recital of the diminutive establishment in summer 1914, before getting on to the main business. Fragments of the story can be gleaned from these sources though, as noted already, Eric Grove’s chapter in Benbow seems to be the only academic treatment exclusively focused on the Naval Air Service in the preWar period
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
