British Expansion in Malaya, 1897–1902

Abstract

Was British expansion in Malaya the unitary expression of an implacable imperialism, in which gradually but inexorably British economic and political enterprise gained indirect hegemony and then unequivocal rule; in which, by friendship and guile, power and diplomacy, Malay chiefs and populace were controlled, Siamese authority negated, and European rivals bested? There was at Whitehall a steady interest in the late nineteenth century by Salisbury, Balfour, Chamberlain and others in furthering British control in Malaya. But the strategy of expansion, ardently pushed by Straits Settlements officials during the period of ‘High Imperialism’ in the late nineteenth century was checked by other imperatives of British imperialism in Asia. The British were reluctant to take any step in Malaya which, by offending and weakening the Siamese, would encourage French expansion in eastern Siam. Further, the Indian Government, the trustee of British military power in Asia, was unwilling to commit large resources to Southeast Asia which might have been required to combat Russia on India's northwest threshold. These factors limited a British forward movement in Malaya. At times, however, British expansionary fervour did burst stridently upon Malays and Siamese. In 1902 the British wrested concessions from Siam which allowed the placement of British ‘advisers’ in Kelantan and Trengganu, and by which Siam abandoned all prerogatives of interfering with these states' internal affairs. This study is directed to comprehension of the strategy of British expansion in Malaya, particularly of British efforts to sequester control of economic concessions and privileges in Kelantan and Trengganu, and the significance of these manoeuvres in preparing for the transfer of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis from Siam to Britain in March, 1909.