Britain's Future in World Affairs

Abstract

Perhaps the most important statement about British foreign policy since World War n was made in the House of Commons by Prime Minister Harold Wilson on January 15 when he announced the winding up of British defence responsibilities in Asia by the end of 1971. Ostensibly this formed part of the cuts in government spending which were designed to make the most of the devaluation of the pound announced in November 1967. The 1967 defence review had, however, already envisaged the ending of Britain's east of Suez policy by 1975 and it was clear that the persisting balance-of-payments problem made the government's attempts to maintain this policy wholly unconvincing. Henceforward then, as Mr. Wilson said in his January statement, Britain would be predominantly a Mediterranean and European power, though with what he called a general military capability outside those areas. The British nuclear deterrent would be unaffected, though it was reasonable to doubt how independent this could be since, by the Nassau agreement of December 1962, Britain relied on the United States for the missiles, though not the warheads, for her four Polaris submarines. Theoretically, the 1955 agreement to share responsibilities with South Africa for defence in the waters round southern Africa remained in being, but it was seriously weakened by the government's decision in December 1967 to continue to respect the United Nations ban on the supply of arms to South Africa.