Britain: Balancing European and Transatlantic Commitments

Abstract

On account of strong transatlantic ties as well as a historically ambivalent relationship to Europe, Britain was the most sceptical — but also, given the size and strength of its military, an essential — member state when it came to the creation of a EU security and defence policy. The Premiership of Tony Blair, and his relenting on the question of an EU defence policy outside NATO structures, therefore not only rang in a sea-change in British foreign policy but also made possible the creation and eventual deployment of military crisis management tools under ESDP. Scepticism on substantial parts of the British policy establishment as well as public opinion on the prospect of an ‘EU army’ and a concurrent weakening of NATO, however, meant that ESDP was not communicated to the British public (Howorth, 2005). The preparation of the first ESDP operation was closely aligned with the US and NATO in order to ensure close transatlantic relations. And, the British position with respect to the evolving utility of ESDP in military crisis management remained careful — and pragmatic even in the absence of strong transatlantic objections to ESDP. Whereas London valued ESDP as a civilian and military crisis management instrument as part of a comprehensive approach to crisis management and SSR, after the events of St Malo, London did not push for a greater involvement or a greater scope for military crisis management.