Britain and the Iraq War

Abstract

The invasion of Iraq commenced on 18 March 2003, with the bombing of Iraqi targets by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, Spain, Italy, and Denmark. However, this bibliography covers the period from the summer of 2001 to July 2016, when the report of the UK’s Iran Inquiry (the Chilcot Report) was finally published, and also presents some more recent scholarly reflections. The Chilcot Report itself considered the period from the summer of 2001 to the end of July 2009, when UK forces left southern Iraq. This bibliography therefore starts with the Chilcot Report, with key references, and some scholarly reflections on its significance. As will be explained, the report is a treasure trove of documents and analysis, and it turned out to be much more hard-hitting than had been anticipated. Second, attention is drawn to two key major works of reference: the 2005 journal article by Gerry Simson, and the 2010 monograph by Marc Weller. Prior to March 2003, it had been widely anticipated that there would be military action against Iraq by the United States and its allies, but that such action would be motivated by the “Bush doctrine” of preemptive action, namely the use of force, announced by President Bush on 1 June 2002. So the third section pays attention to the pre-2003 scholarly literature to this effect, including a symposium that went to press just as the military action commenced. To the surprise of almost all commentators, the US and UK, despite having failed to secure authorization from the UN Security Council, did advance a legal justification, which was in itself a relief for supporters of the UN and the international rule of law. But the US and UK did not rely on preemptive self-defense, but rather on the argument that the authorization of use of force (“all necessary means”), in UN Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, had been revived, or was still operative, despite UNSC Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 on the ceasefire. The fourth section reviews the relevant literature. Finally, references are given for some of the more significant literature on the consequences of the invasion. The majority of scholars have concluded the invasion and its incompetent follow-up were a direct cause of the rise of Daesh (Islamic State), the continued turmoil in Iraq, and the ongoing conflict in Syria. Attention then turns to violations of the international law of armed conflict and international human rights law, and finally to the longer term consequences of the invasion.