Britain and the Armenian question, 1912–1914 a study in realpolitik

Abstract

The Armenian Question owes its notoriety primarily to the massacres of the indigenous population of the area during the 1890's and the First World War. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is these two pivotal periods of recent Armenian history which have tended to dominate discussion of the topic. One result has been the emergence of a controversial debate over the exact causes and nature of the Armenian question;' another, which is less laudable, has been the comparative neglect of historical interest in-,the issue for the years between the two main bouts of massacres.2 Particularly is this the case with regard to the diplomatic negotiations between the Great Powers on the Armenian Question during the period which preceded the outbreak of war in 1914. Recent surveys of British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, to take the most notable example, barely allude to the topic.3. Such neglect is unfortunate, principally because it distorts both the continuity and the change in Britain's attitude towards the Armenians before World War I. The British Government was deeply involved in the intricacies of the Armenian Question by the 1890's;4 her interest in the subject did not decline thereafter. Moreover, until 1914 her policy remained remarkably consistent. In principle, Britain was opposed to the annexation of Armenia by Russia, and in favour of Turkish reforms of the province. The formal entente with Russia in 1907, although a dominant influence on the subsequent formulation of British foreign policy in its entirety, did not alter this view. What it did, however, was to make it much more difficult to sustain and, in operative terms, to implement. Increasingly, it became impossible for British policy-makers to treat the Armenian question as an isolated issue. Instead, policy towards Armenia had to be judged and shaped in the light of such wider consideration as the fate, and European alignment, of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, Britain's relations with Germany and Russia, andmore specificallyBritain's efforts to preserve intact her interests in India, the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. At this level, the period between 1912 and 1914 would appear to be of particular interest; primarily, this is because it was during those years that three separate, although related, trends can be seen to have come to a head. One was the accelerated rate of Ottoman disintegration. Indeed, Ottoman disasters during the First Balkan War of 1912 raised the question of the fate of the Empire's Asiatic provinces in a particularly acute form and markedly increased the danger of a Great Power clash over their possible distribution. Another influence was the progress betweeen 1912 and 1914 of AngloGerman-Ottoman negotiations concerning respective commercial and strategic interests in the Baghdad Railway, Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. A third was the steady-even if reluctant-shift of opinion respecting the Ottoman Empire in the British Foreign Office itself. Although officials in London (but not in the Embassy in Contantinople) continued to support