Abstract
The mechanisms underlying the relation between development and security are difficult to define and poorly understood. This has not hindered various donor countries, NGOs, or international organizations from designing and implementing Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives with the presumption that increasing security, usually by strengthening state capacity, will lead to increased socioeconomic development. However, in many postwar settings, low state capacity is seen as a desired outcome. The argument in this article is that an exclusive focus on formal state structures in SSR efforts makes several assumption that reduce the possibility of success. There is no "one size fits all" approach to statebuilding, and designing SSR activities without taking into account the premises of the local economic structures may only lead to short-term regime security.
Highlights
The argument in this article is that an overbearing focus on formal state structures in security sector reform (SSR) efforts relies on two crucial assumptions whose nonfulfillment reduce the possibility of SSR success
The political and security vacuum that may emerge after conflict can be structured to be exploited by less than benign actors such as warlords, criminal networks, and corrupt political elites, or traditional governance structures can reemerge, but all with the result that the formal state is but one among several competing organizations that govern society
There is no one-sizefits-all approach to statebuilding, and designing SSR activities without taking into account the premises of local economic structures may only lead to short-term regime security
Summary
Rule of law: Jackson (2011). Norms: Denney (2011), Edmunds (2007). 4. Quote: Egnell and Haldén 39); see Edmunds (2007). Academic discussion: Brzoska (2006); Edmunds (2007). Not universal: Egnell and Haldén (2009)
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