Abstract
Baggs and Chemero (2018) propose that certain tensions between enaction and ecological psychology arise due different interpretations about what is meant by the “environment.” In the enactive approach the emphasis is on the umwelt, which describes the environment as the “meaningful, lived surroundings of a given individual.” The ecological approach, on the other hand, emphasises what they refer to as the habitat “the environment as a set of resources for a typical, or ideal, member of a species.” By making this distinction, these authors claim they are able to retain the best of both the ecological and the enactive approaches. Herein I propose an account of the individuation of habits that straddles this distinction, what I call a compatabilist account. This is done in two parts. The first part teases out a host of compatibilities that exist between the enactive account as developed by Di Paolo et al. (2017) and the skilled intentionality framework as developed by Bruineberg and Rietveld (2014) and Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014). In part two these compatibilities are brought together with the that these compatibilities can be brought together with the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon to develop the notion of enhabiting. Enhabiting describes a set of ongoing processes by which an umwelt emerges from and is reproduced within the relationship between an embodied subject and their habitat. Thus, enhabiting points toward a point of intersection between enaction and ecological psychology. To enhabit is bring forth (to enact), within (to inhabit).
Highlights
Convergences between enaction and ecological psychology are “many and strong,” according to Di Paolo (2016a, p. 327)
Inspired by the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, it offers an account it offers an account of the ongoing constitution of habitual organizations at multiple timescales, through establishing interdependencies between bodily structures and structures in the habitat
Enhabiting provides an account of the individuation of sensemaking frames based on the emergence of interdependencies between bodily structures and structures in the habitat
Summary
Convergences between enaction and ecological psychology are “many and strong,” according to Di Paolo (2016a, p. 327). 7), “is the physical world described relative to a potential actor, or set of actors.” This account speaks of a dispositional account of affordances, and its recognition is valuable for it provides the basis for an empirically grounded antirepresentationalist approach to understanding perception and action, one that helps acknowledge the basic intuition that we occupy a shared world despite our individual histories. Through related concepts concerning the abilities of agents, the timescales that organize action, the role of the “environment,” and questions around identity and normativity Concluding this first part, it is suggested that the compatibilities highlighted can be brought into a more enduring relationship through the necessity of their mutual deployment in accounting for the individuation of novel habit structures. Inspired by the philosophy of Gilbert Simondon, it offers an account it offers an account of the ongoing constitution of habitual organizations at multiple timescales, through establishing interdependencies between bodily structures and structures in the habitat
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
