Briefing: African dam building as extraversion: The case of Sudan's dam programme, Nubian resistance, and the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Yemen

Abstract

On 3 November 2015, under the watchful eyes of Saudi King Salman and Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, their respective finance ministers, Ibrahim Al-Assaf and Badredin Mahmoud, signed four agreements that committed the kingdom to funding three big dam projects in Sudan, as well as the cultivation and irrigation of more than a million acres near already-constructed dams on Sudanese territory.1 These framework accords were expanded upon when, in February 2016, Al-Assaf travelled to Khartoum to meet Mutaz Musa, Minister of Water Resources and Electricity and head of Sudan's hugely powerful Dam Implementation Unit. Ignoring the howls of anti-dam protesters assaulted by security forces, Al-Assaf committed US$5 billion in dam project finance to Sudan, which has struggled to revive economic growth following the secession of South Sudan in 2011 and the loss of three-quarters of its oil production. The multi-billion dollar promises are a quid pro quo for the participation of the Sudanese Armed Forces since March 2015 in the devastating war waged in Yemen against Houthi insurgents by King Salman and his 30-year-old Deputy Crown Prince, Mohammad. Apart from receiving extensive support at central bank level over the 2015 summer, the military-Islamist Al-Ingaz (Salvation) regime in Khartoum also extracted concessions for the building of a thermal power plant, rural development initiatives, and greater efforts to facilitate Sudanese livestock exports to the Kingdom. Its key demand, however, was the funding of the construction of the dams.