Bridging the gap: cynical disavowal and its rationalizations

Abstract

ABSTRACTThis article critically examines the concept of ‘cynicism’ as a disavowal of ideological attachment in advanced consumer capitalist societies. I argue that, while this cynicism is a significant phenomenon today, in that people often distance themselves from clear political affiliations and belief systems, it is not necessarily socially dominant, as some theorists maintain, and has the structure of an ideology. I identify three recurrent features in existing theories of cynicism, such as those of Sloterdijk and Žižek: that it is a widespread social condition; that it conforms to social expectations despite awareness of their problems; and that its lack of beliefs make it immune to ideology critique. I then question these assumptions from the perspective that many people still consciously invest in certain political and cultural values, and that, while cynicism does not morally affirm social relations, it involves forms of belief. Specifically, cynics do not simply recognize social problems and accept them regardless, but ‘rationalize’ that acceptance, through various contestable assumptions. Thus, while I follow Žižek’s understanding of cynicism as fetishistic disavowal, or a gap between knowledge and behaviour motivated by ‘irrational’ unconscious attachment, I argue that rationalization is its necessary conscious support, or the ‘symptomal’ point whose content can be analysed and criticized.