Bridging pluralisms

Abstract

The general introduction of Chapter 1 presented basic definitions, rough arguments and main issues in order to posit representational plurality and pluralism the specific objects of the volume. This chapter has a related aim: to bring readers to see representational plurality not only as a general concept regarding human cognition, but also to convince them that the disciplines of psychology, science education, and philosophy of sciences, do have complementary or partially shared perspectives on the phenomenon of representational plurality. In the first part of the chapter, the developmental continuity between these disciplines is stressed: in each, arguments support the existence of representational plurality, but at different levels of expertise. In the second part, we suggest that much confusion could be avoided when reading the many plurality theses and assertions across disciplines if it was kept in mind that we are in the potential presence of several kinds of stances about plurality: descriptive, axiological, methodological, technological. These kinds of pluralist stances are complementary rather than conflictual. Finally, with the aim of revealing some of the ancestry of ideas about representational pluralism at various levels of cognitive expertise, an appendix offers a brief presentation of a few past pluralist theses.