Brentano’s Theory of Judgment and the Connection of Feelings and Acts of Will

Abstract

The final three chapters of the PES feature a psychological elucidation of the epistemological foundations of Brentano’s system as well as the presentation of his unique theory of emotion, feeling and volition that would later serve as the basis from which he developed his ethical doctrines. Brentano’s theory of judgment, discussed in chapter 7 of Book Two of the PES, distinguishes judgments from presentations and argues that the two activities are unique modes of intentionally relating to the same presented content. Brentano’s discussion of the theory of judgment is one of the most innovative sections of his entire book. Developing an essentially neo-Aristotelian theory of intellectual judgment as affirmation or denial of things holding outside the mind, Brentano nonetheless challenges and rejects Aristotle and the entire Aristotelian tradition for the inability to either clearly grasp the proper logical form of cognitive judgments or for failing to conceive of them as intentionally directed mental acts. In developing his alternative theory of judgment, Brentano ties up ambiguities in his earlier Aristotelian writings regarding inductive and deductive logical inference as well as the role of terms and concrete presentations to conceptual thought. What is more, Brentano simultaneously puts forward a new, and what can be called “phenomenological”, theory of truth and belief states.