Abstract
We simultaneously perceive many things—colours, tastes, sounds, etc.—and are aware that we do so. Are the mental acts that we are simultaneously conscious of distinct mental acts, independent of each other? In Psychologie Brentano’s answer was an adamant No. All mental acts that we are jointly aware of are conceptual parts of one and the same mental activity (Mental Monism). Soon afterwards he changed his mind to Yes, our simultaneous mental acts are distinct and mutually independent, but co-conscious acts are accidents of one soul. I explore Brentano’s Mental Monism and defend it against Brentano’s own critique. At any time, there is only one mental act that we partially describe when we talk about seeing and hearing and consciousness of these activities.
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