Brentano, Stout, and Moore

Abstract

G. F. Stout, working as a philosopher in Cambridge in the early 1890s, was engaged in the new science of empirical psychology. His main inspiration for his Analytic Psychology was Franz Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Stout's theories of intentionality and judgement and his method of analytic psychology have played a role in the transition from Bradley's idealism to early analytic philosophy. Stout's theory is best understood as a reaction to Brentano's innovative account of these notions, and argues that Moore was thus acquainted with Brentanian ideas. As there was no direct influence of Brentano on Moore or Russell before 1903 with respect to intentionality, judgement, or ethics, Stout's Brentanian ideas may have played a mediating role. Both Russell and Moore read Stout's Analytic Psychology carefully, and they must also have become acquainted with Stout's ideas, there are also some important differences between Brentano and Moore regarding the question of the objectivity of logic and ethics.