BRENTANO ON SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY AND POSITIVISM*

Flávio Vieira Curvello

doi:10.1590/0100-512x2021n15002fvc

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this paper, I analyze Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, according to which the philosophical method should be none other than the natural scientific one. The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he actually argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can also be applied to philosophical domain. A fuller comprehension of that idea is provided by Brentano’s writings on Comte’s positivism.

Highlights

RESUMO No presente artigo, analiso a quarta tese de habilitação de Brentano, de acordo com a qual o método da Filosofia tem de ser aquele da ciência natural
The meaning of this thesis can be initially assessed through an examination of Brentano’s views on the relationship between natural and human sciences. His arguments for methodological unity in this debate show that he argues for an overarching idea of scientific knowledge, which is not restricted to the fields already recognized as scientific, but which can be applied to philosophical domain
In order to do that, I will first address the thinker’s famous fourth habilitation thesis, which states that philosophical groundwork must be done in strict accordance with natural scientific methodology

Summary

The method of philosophy as a natural scientific method

The stepping stone for our discussion is laid in Brentano’s “Habilitation Theses”, submitted to the University of Würzburg in 1866 and defended by means of a disputatio. They rather aim at retrieving something more fundamental to the cognitive attitude of the natural scientist – something which lays the ground for his different concrete approaches to nature, determining his many practical ways of observing its entities and processes, analyzing the observed data, drawing and reassessing conclusions, etc Such an intellectual point of departure would consist of a radical commitment to grasp the fact of interest and describe the different ways it occurs; to achieve a most comprehensive view of the regularities therein; to continuously conform the observation to the requirements of the fact, so that the way of approaching it does not become a way of covering it up or deforming its nature, but rather of clarifying it; to always focus on carefully defined issues instead of overarching ones, even though the progress of the research will be slower and more laborious Brentano’s case against Exner clearly exceeds the relationship between natural and human science, consisting rather in the postulation of an idea of scientific knowledge in general It is precisely because of its general character that his arguments allow us to understand the fourth habilitation thesis. The philosopher must give up any intentions of intuitively accessing the “domain of what is utterly inapprehensible” and focus on the factuality, employing a method “corresponding to the things” (Brentano, 1968, pp. 95-97).

Positivism and the definition of the scientificity of philosophy

Concluding remarks