Abstract
Studying a binary-choice trust game, we find that trustors who consider trustees to be obligated to reciprocate are ceteris paribus less willing to trust. We argue that norm-orientated trustors anticipate that they will experience negative emotions should trustees violate the obligation to reciprocate. In order to avoid norm violation, trustors lower their willingness to trust. An additional binary-choice trust game, in which subjects acted as trustors and subsequently as trustees, reveals that the obligation that trustors assign to the trustee role may be based on social projection.
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