Breaking the 'Iron Rice Bowl:' Evaluating the Effect of the Tenure-track System on Research Productivity in China

Abstract

In recent decades, many European and Asian universities have reformed their personnel practices from traditional systems, which grant faculty members permanent employment from the time of hire, to tenure-track systems that require passing a review of research achievements. Using personnel system reforms of economics departments in China as a quasi-experiment, we compare effects of tenure-track and traditional personnel systems on faculty’s research productivity, and investigate to what extent does the adoption of tenure-track system contribute to the recent increase in global rankings of China’s economic research. We find that tenure-track faculty publish 67.5 percent more articles in the top and secondary field journals in economics than those hired under the traditional system. Further investigation shows that the positive effect mainly stems from intensified peer competition, research focus shifting, and increased research collaboration. We also find that the tenure-track system generates positive spillover effects on non-tenure-track faculty.