Abstract

In terms of its doctrine and training, the United States military has been transformed by the war in Iraq. The army, which is carrying the principal load among the military services, has embraced counter-insurgency as one of its primary missions. These changes reflect the military's ability to adapt to the changing battlefield. They are intended not only to guide the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also future operations in the ‘long war’ against violent Islamic extremists. The new emphasis on counter-insurgency, however, is largely disconnected from the Defense Department's previously established spending priorities and personnel policy. The result is that American defence is in a state of strategic confusion. There are not enough forces to effectively carry out counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while maintaining a strategic reserve for other threats. To fully exploit the long overdue emphasis on counterinsurgency, maintain sufficient forces for dealing with unanticipated contingencies and bring coherence to American defence strategy, the Pentagon needs to increase the United States' ground forces.

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