Brazil's Nuclear Activities

Abstract

The Policy Forum “Brazil's nuclear puzzle” by L. Palmer and G. Milhollin (22 Oct. 2004, p. [617][1]) contains preposterous allegations about my country's nuclear activities. Palmer and Milhollin state that “Resende [a new Brazilian nuclear facility] will have the potential to produce enough 235U to make five to six implosion-type warheads per year.” This assertion attempts to sell purely speculative data as hard fact and fails to point out that high levels of enrichment demand specifically designed installations. The authors write that “Brazil took the extraordinary step of barring the plant's doors to the IAEA's [International Atomic Energy Agency's] inspectors.” Every nuclear facility in Brazil is under IAEA safeguards, and IAEA inspectors have already had access to Resende's cascade hall on seven occasions. Palmer and Milhollin state that the physical screen Brazil has built around its centrifuges at Resende “will make it harder—if not impossible—for the IAEA to do its job.” Brazil and the IAEA are working for the placement of effective and utterly credible safeguards. The IAEA will have access to all tubes, valves, and connections in the cascade to ensure that no uranium is being enriched beyond the 5% level. Contrary to Palmer and Milhollin's assertions, Brazil is not a “serious challenge to the IAEA's authority.” Brazil has an impeccable relationship with the IAEA and is simply discussing with them how to reconcile Brazil's commitments to the IAEA with the country's legitimate right to protect proprietary technology. Palmer and Milhollin claim that “[d]uring the 1980s, Brazil ran a secret effort to build an atomic bomb…” In the 1980s, Brazil implemented efforts to develop an autonomous capacity of enriching uranium for the production of electricity. Palmer and Milhollin suggest that “the United States [should] convince Brazil to… be a good nuclear citizen.” For decades, Brazil has been a committed champion of the twin causes of disarmament and nonproliferation and is party to all major treaties and instruments (NPT, Tlatelolco, CTBT, NSG, and MTCR, among others). With the creation of ABACC, Brazil and Argentina pioneered a scheme for bilateral nuclear inspections that sets an example for other regions. Brazil is therefore a model nuclear citizen. # Response {#article-title-2} The Brazilian Ambassador's response to our Policy Forum is gravely misinformed. He claims that during the 1980s, Brazil sought to enrich uranium for the production of electricity, implying that Brazil did not seek to build a nuclear weapon. In doing so, the Ambassador is in denial about something his own government and the rest of the world acknowledged in the early 1990s ([1][2]). In noting that the IAEA has had access to the Resende facility on several occasions, the Ambassador is glossing over the fact that, for several months earlier this year, IAEA inspectors and Brazilian officials were at an impasse regarding inspections. In violation of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Brazil had refused to allow IAEA inspectors to view its centrifuges. Instead, Brazil erected a screen around the centrifuges, citing concerns that the IAEA would not protect its technology. Denying access to the facility in violation of treaty obligations and under the unlikely suggestion that the IAEA cannot protect trade secrets can only be viewed as a challenge to the IAEA's authority. The Ambassador further misses the point when he states that specifically designed installations are required to produce high-enriched uranium. Our point is that, if the centrifuges are hidden from the inspectors' view, Brazil could be siphoning off low-enriched uranium that would allow it to stockpile this material. If Brazil decided to become a nuclear power, such a stockpile would make it easier for Brazil to build a bomb before the world could react. Although we do not assert that Brazil aims to produce nuclear weapons, the capability would be there. Since our Policy Forum was published in October, the IAEA and Brazil have reportedly come to an agreement whereby IAEA inspectors will be able to view the valves and tubes leading to and from the centrifuges. 1. 1.[↵][3]1. J. Brooke , N.Y. Times , 9 Oct. 1990, p. A1. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.1104209 [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text