Abstract
This paper aims to assess causes and the interactions between decision making, stakeholders and individuals, law and public policies to build a more precise overview of the relations, the possible results, and the factors which can interfere with environmental conditions and dynamics in Brazilian Amazônia. To better elucidate the issue, rational choice and deterrence theories were used, and a model based on game theory was built. It shows that the noncooperative Nash solution is compatible with the full depletion of the Brazilian Amazônia’s resources and the tragedy of the commons could be certain. The lack of incentive for greener practices and deficiencies in the Brazilian law system can be pointed out as two of the main causes for the current noncollaborative interactions between the agents that lead to environmental degradation in the region. However, other aspects and circumstances are being disregarded in Brazilian environmental law and policies.
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