BİR MANTIK TANIMI MÜNASEBETİYLE

Abstract

Abstract science or thinking systems occurred as a result of a century long separation process from concrete thinking. The most vivid example of this is Aristotelian logic which constitutes the first formal system. Aristotelian logic is the ‘picture’ of an ontological truth that is accepted by Aristotle as truth. This ‘picture’ is incomplete on a formal level, in fact the foundation of this logic is not logic but ontological principles, since one thing cannot be present and absent at the same time, or propositions (e.g. “a thing itself”) are general propositions that express the basic characteristics of things in reality. Sciences have reached their present status, that is to say, “a totality of interrelationships”, by gradually throwing off their anthropomorphic elements. Viewed in this context, logic is an exception, to be more precise, logic has just begun to display a sense of development similar to that of science, a reason for which is related to the fact that Aristotelian logic is no longer the abstract backbone that science rests upon since Galileo-Newton's contributions to science and that it has remained a system of thoughts that informs about quiddity outside of science. In this way, the confusion over what logic is has continued up until now due to its foundation based on the principle of logic, in other words, laying things of non-abstract principle on its foundation. In this study Aristotelian logic and Ferdinand Gonseth’s attitude towards logic are compared in the process of separation between abstract and concrete systems of thinking, the relationship between the two as well as their counterarguments are explained, and logic and science’s perception of the abstract and concrete is explored.