Abstract

We consider the problem of constructing a general protocol for secure two-party computation in a way that preserves security under concurrent composition. In our treatment, we focus on the case where an a-priori bound on the number of concurrent sessions is specified before the protocol is constructed. (a.k.a. bounded concurrency). We make no setup assumptions. Lindel (STOC 2003) has shown that any protocol for bounded-concurrent secure two-party computation, whose security is established via black-box simulation, must have round complexity that is strictly larger than the bound on the number of concurrent sessions. In this paper, we construct a (non black-box) protocol for realizing bounded-concurrent secure two-party computation in a constant number of rounds. Our constructions rely on the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations, as well as on the existence of hash functions that are collision-resistant against subexponential sized circuits.

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