Boots on Unstable Ground: Democratic Governance of the Armed Forces under post 9/11 US-Philippine Military Relations

Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center: The First 25 Years

REVIEWS I83 Urals and Siberian Okrugs).There is not enough space in this review to give greater details, but suffice it to say that each of the chapters continues the excellent quality exhibited in the firsthalf of the book in examining regional, centre and military relations. The details covering the financial predicament of the nuclear facilities, their vulnerabilityto utility outages, combined with the continual securitybreaches by criminal elements makes for a compelling read. The concluding chapter provides an invaluable summary combining the general problems confrontingthe Russian nuclear establishmentwith the specific conditions within each of the regions examined. The final section of the chapter discussesthe strategicimplicationsof the problems examined and provides several policy recommendationsfor the future. In sum, this book is one of those rare edited volumes that is extremelywell researched and well thought out with consistently high quality throughout that is a must read for those concerned with nuclearand/or Russian issues.It providesthe readerwith everythingthey need to know about Russia'snuclear complex but were afraid to ask (because some of the answersyou may not wish to hear). There are some minor criticisms. The main criticism is the positioning of the penultimate chapter on the implementation of the US Non-proliferation Assistance Programs, which examines the role of the Department of Defense and the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme in implementing the US assistance programmes and the problems they encountered in so doing. Given the topic of the chapter, it should reallyhave been placed in the first,more general, section. In addition, a list of abbreviations is missing, something essentialin a researcharea repletewith acronyms. Finally, a more detailed map of the regions than the one provided would improve the understandingof those who are workingin the nuclear field but are not Russian specialists. Department ofPolitics J. GLENN University of Southampton Brudny, Y., Frankel,J. and Hoffman, S. (eds). Restructuring Post-Communist Russia.CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridgeand New York, 2004. xii + 286 pp. Figures.Tables. Notes. Index. f4o.oo: $6o.oo. THISFestschraft is devoted to Theodore H. Friedgut ('Ted' to friends and colleagues), a pioneer of work on Soviet politics outside Moscow, including an acclaimed history of Donetsk, who himself contributes an essay. Largely derivedfrom a conferenceheld at the Hebrew UniversityofJerusalem in May 200I in tribute to the dedicatee on his retirement,the contributions,updated in mid-2003, were edited by three of his formercolleagues.And a fine, stimulating collection it is, notwithstandingthe diversityof approach and style of scholarsfrom the United States, Israel, the UK and Russia. The unifying theme is the road covered by Russia towardsthe democracy and market economy aimed for after the Communist system undertook perestroikain the late I98os. Specialists on those countries have been preoccupied with either prescribing the way forward, or attempting to explain 184 SEER, 85, I, 2007 the failure. Within individual disciplines scholars apply approaches and test models that by definition focus on a restricted range of variables, opening themselves to challenge not only by their fellows but also by representatives of other disciplines.A multi-disciplinaryapproach undertakenby a single scholar or by a group working in parallel is not confined to models and approaches from a particularschool, and the resultmay be a more satisfying composite picture, providingbetter 'understanding'than the 'explanations'of individual disciplines. Human society is, after all, a complex whole, and a narrow focus is unlikely to identify all features affecting its functioning and development. The work of the dozen scholarsincluded here gives individual insights, and constitutesa complex picture. Opening the collection, Peter Rutland identifies three simultaneous processes: economic transformation, democratization and nation-building, influencing one another and interacting with social processes as individuals pursue their lives in new circumstances. They have also been taking place in a world anxious for the transitionto succeed, satisfiedwith relativelylow signals of success, and willing to overlookweaknesses.Anatoly M. Khazanov argues that the post-totalitarian state is weak where it should be strong (upholdinglegality and pursuingcoherent policies)and strongwhere it should be weak (continuingcontrol over the economy and a willingnessto cut legal corners).AlexanderJ. Motyl gloomily looks acrosspost-Communiststatesand concludes (p. 67)that 'prospectsfor democracyin the formerSoviet space look decidedly bleak', while Valerie Bunce, searching for the specific features of post-Communist transitions,picks up nationalism as a key...

INTRODUCTION Servicemembers and veterans who experience major limb loss are provided assistance in recovery and rehabilitation but are often frustrated when it comes to finding resources to help them along the way. More than 850 servicemembers and veterans from Operation Iraqi Freedom/ Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) [1] and more than 2,500 from the Vietnam war [2] have major limb loss. Many organizations are available to provide assistance and resources to these men and women. The needs of the servicemembers and veterans vary by level of limb loss, severity of other injuries and comorbidities, stage of rehabilitation, need for financial support, benefits, and many other factors. Fortunately, many agencies established services for servicemembers and veterans with major limb loss. This article identifies information sources for individuals with major limb loss as follows: (1) resources for military personnel, (2) resources from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), (3) other resources for veterans, (4) resources for family members, and (5) resources in the public domain. Five detailed tables identify the agencies, their contact information, and services available for each category. These resources were considered helpful by the participants of the Survey for Prosthetic Use (Appendix 1, available online only) and the Expert Panel members (Appendix 2, available online only); are known by us to support servicemembers, veterans, and others with limb loss; and are in the public domain. This list is not all-inclusive; resources and organizations change rapidly. RESOURCES FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL Numerous support systems are in place for servicemembers with traumatic limb loss while on Active Duty--notably, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, DC; Brooke Army Medical Center, San Antonio, Texas; and Naval Medical Center, San Diego, California. Military and civilian organizations and agencies provide a broad spectrum of services. Several programs are described next. Table 1 provides additional resources for military personnel. Army Career and Alumni Program The U.S. Army created the Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP) (http://www.acap.army.mil/) to provide transition assistance to soldiers and family members separating or retiring from Active Duty with ACAP Centers located on most major U.S. Army installations. The program is mandated by Congress and part of U.S. Army/ Department of Defense (DOD) policy. ACAP provides preseparation counseling, employment workshops, VA briefings, employment assistance, tools for writing resumes and cover letters, advice, and support. ACAP's Disabled Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) is offered for servicemembers who are leaving military service because of disability. This program encourages and assists servicemembers with their decisions about the VA's Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Service. DTAP facilitates applications for vocational rehabilitation benefits and services. Group sessions explain eligibility, benefits, and availability of educational and vocational counseling. DTAP sessions for hospitalized or convalescing servicemembers are coordinated by the VA Regional Office. Hope For The Warriors Established in 2006, Hope For The Warriors[TM] (http:// www.hopeforthewarriors.org) is a civilian, 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization whose mission is to enhance quality of life for wounded U.S. servicemembers and their families with short- and long-term care and to ensure that fallen warriors are not forgotten, nor their families left in need. Its programs include the award-winning Warrior's Wish, recreational outings, athletic events, transitional housing, financial support for immediate needs, support groups, professional development, and a rehabilitation center. Military OneSource Military OneSource (http://www.militaryonesource.com) has services and information for military personnel and their families who need help with child care, personal finances, emotional support, relocation information, education, elder care, legal advice, and other special circumstances. …

: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had a profound impact on the nation's economy and governmental organization; on its budgets for national defense; and on the mission of its armed forces, particularly the U.S. Air Force. Even the date--9/11--quickly became iconic, and without the hijackings, the first three major U.S. military operations of the new century would not have been launched: Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. Air Force has played an important role in all three. The 9/11 attacks precipitated the launch of Operation Noble Eagle and obliged the U.S. Air Force to deploy forces to protect the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Hawaii, and Guam against additional air attacks. The nature, timing, and effectiveness of the air defense response initiated by the Northeast Air Defense Sector on the morning of September 11 depended on many factors. Several were partly or entirely outside the control of the U.S. Air Force, such as the speed of the attacks and the tactics of the hijackers; the knowledge, experience, intuition, and initiative of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) personnel; and the involvement and actions of those higher up the civilian chain of command. But the air defense response depended perhaps most on the effectiveness of the communications, coordination, and interaction within and between the FAA on the one hand and NORAD and NEADS on the other.

This paper addresses the need for simulation of voice and data communication demands during civil and military crisis events. Modeling of federal, state, and local civilian agencies in addition to military forces can lead to better planning and execution decisions during the crisis. The need has become particularly acute following recent terrorists attacks on the United States. Preliminary crisis communication modeling capabilities exist in the Network Warfare Simulation (NETWARS) software that has been successfully used to model networks supporting the military's Operation Enduring Freedom. The authors examine the software's features, limitations, and potentials.

: In counterinsurgency warfare, training and advising host nation police forces is a key task for the counterinsurgent. Ideally, this task would be assigned to civilian law enforcement agencies. However, in a non-permissive environment where there is a strong insurgent, it is very difficult for civilian agencies to carry out this task. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the task of police force training was eventually assigned to US military police mentor teams (PMTs) starting in the spring of 2007. The military assumption of these duties occurred after other attempts to develop the Afghan police had either failed or were progressing too slowly. This paper addresses the difficulties these PMTs faced, the process by which a plan emerged to utilize these teams, and how PMTs were absolutely essential to COIN execution. Counterinsurgency expert David Galula's model for measuring the strength of the insurgent is used to describe the strength of the insurgency in Southern Afghanistan. Additionally, Galula's COIN operations model is used as a framework to describe the actual police development campaign that ensued. The main method of research is personal experience supported by interviews with senior Army officers who were intimately involved with the 2007-2008 police development campaign. The findings are relatively straight forward. There are several key tasks in police development that require military PMTs in a non-permissive environment, and these tasks must be initiated in a deliberate manner ASAP after expulsion of the insurgent from a given area. Moreover, all development efforts in COIN, be they police, governance, judiciary, etc., are described as tasks requiring hands-on mentoring and over watch by forces on the ground, civilian or military as appropriate. Finally, these forces should be embedded to the maximum extent possible with host nation personnel.

ABSTRACTCase summary, by James Cook (Case Study Editor):In the final issue of the 2015 volume of the Journal of Military Ethics, we published a case study entitled “Coining an Ethical Dilemma: The Impunity of Afghanistan’s Indigenous Security Forces”, written by Paul Lushenko. The study detailed two extra-judicial killings (EJKs) by Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel in an area stabilized and overseen by a US-led Combined Task Force (CTF). To deter further EJKs following the first incident, the CTF’s commander reported the incidents up his chain of command and used the limited tools at his disposal to influence local indigenous officials directly. Apparently, the ANP unit took no notice. In his commentary on the case study, Paul Robinson considered moral compromise in war more generally. Coalition troops in Afghanistan, for instance, have encountered not just EJKs but also sexual abuse of minors, killing of non-combatants, kidnapping, torture, and widespread corruption. What should the soldier on the ground do if indigenous personnel violate Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) with impunity? Refusing to serve will not right or prevent moral wrongs, while staying on to fight the good but futile fight will mire the soldier in moral compromise. “ … [S]oldiers faced with this dilemma have no good options. The systemic failings surrounding them mean that it is probable that nothing they do will help”. In a concluding note, I suggested that while an individual soldier may indeed have no good options, as Paul Robinson suggests, that soldier’s military and nation at large are obliged to do what they can. At least, they must keep to the moral high ground so as not to give indigenous security forces an excuse to misbehave, and determine the nature of crimes such as EJKs: are they outlaw acts or in fact endorsed by the indigenous culture and perhaps even government? Below Colonel Dave Barnes, himself a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom, analyzes Paul Lushenko’s case study at “ … the local, tactical level: If a commander is in this situation – where her unit witnesses an EJK or other war crime – what should she do?”

: Today the U.S. military confronts transnational and theologically based radical Islamic insurgent movements. In Afghanistan and Iraq these insurgents have joined with local insurgents that comprise elements of the deposed Taliban and Ba'athist regimes respectively and other groups including criminals and foreign fighters. Collectively these groups have one objective; to overthrow regimes they consider illegitimate to evict any vestige of foreign influence associated with the existing order and to seize power for themselves. The predicted global persistence of insurgencies and the constant pressures placed on our military forces to confront insurgency necessitates the restructuring of the existing U.S. Army Special Forces Command headquarters organization into a standing deployable Unconventional Warfare Task Force. This organizational model offers the Department of Defense a permanent expeditionary and cohesive headquarters specifically designed to command and control a modular unconventional capabilities-based force while minimizing the size of direct conventional force participation in future counterinsurgency campaigns. My intent is to briefly examine the key aspects of the security environment the lessons learned from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM force structure considerations and forces structure recommendations to determine the most effective organizational model at the national level for conducting counterinsurgency. My conclusion will ultimately make the recommendation to restructure the existing U.S. Army Special Forces Command Headquarters into standing deployable Unconventional Warfare Task Force to combat current and future insurgencies.

“Hurricane Katrina – Unorganized, unprepared and internationally embarrassed” Despite well defined, pre-exisiting organizational plans and national response strategies, Hurricane Katrina exposed major weaknesses in the ability of a region or nation to respond to a tragedy of significant magnitude. Significant lessons were learned from the event. Must have in place: • A national and regional disaster response plan – A “Chain of Command / Responsibility” Doctrine • A national and regional disaster response system • National, regional and local “Incident Command” structures • Emergency supply stockpiles • Pre-established communication frequencies Major considerations: • Make this a military function – make all civilian agencies report to them – Military has the comm, logistics, command structure, personnel and the training to take on this mission. • Train for an event at regional and national levels • Cross train all responders • Eliminate the red tape at the front end of the event – Mobilize and “do it”

This study examines how defense institutions and personnel are formally organized in Latin America. In a region long plagued by praetorian armies, it is especially important that organizational designs ensure that civilians maintain institutional control over armed forces. For this to occur, it is argued that those designs must incorporate certain principles: (a) enhance the civilian presence in key defense institutions, (b) empower defense ministries, (c) lower the military's vertical authority along the chain of command, and (d) unify civilian power while dividing military power. Based on an examination of legal documents and other data for sixteen Latin American democracies, findings show three general organizational patterns: an ideal—typical defense structure that achieves all four objectives, a second best defense structure that still leaves too much military power unified, and a dual command structure that is least desirable for weakening the defense ministry while coalescing military might high up the ladder of influence.

This study examines the phenomenon of informal civil—military relations. Informal behaviors are those that normally do not occur within the chain of command, are not mandated by law, and do not conform to official procedures. Politicians and soldiers discover that formal, institutional routines are sometimes too constraining and that they can advance their interests more effectively by amending, circumventing, or violating those routines. The party most aggrieved by the rules of the game initiates an informal solution. Whether the other side goes along depends on how divergent its preferences are with the aggrieved party. Greatly divergent preferences result in unilateral informalities, less divergent but still negotiable positions yield bilateral-conflictive encounters, and convergent preferences result in cooperative ventures. Case studies on Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia exemplify three different kinds of informal encounters and their impacts on civilian policy choices and military interests.

On 7 October 2001, a US-led military coalition launched Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan's Taliban government, toppling it after just two months of fighting. United Nations Security Council resolution 1386 established an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on 20 December 2001 to help the Afghan Interim Authority maintain security in and around Kabul. In light of ISAF's relative success, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, UN officials, and others soon called for to expand its operations into the provinces. US officials were not interested, however, believing that a traditional peacekeeping approach would be ineffective in Afghanistan. US allies were unwilling to deploy large numbers of troops to patrol Afghanistan's remote cities and towns. A 2003 RAND study noted there were initially 18 to 20 peacekeepers per thousand people in Bosnia and Kosovo. (1) To achieve such a ratio in Afghanistan would have required deploying hundreds of thousands of troops in a country that has been historically wary of a heavy foreign presence. During the summer of 2002, US officials developed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to spread the ISAF effect, without expanding itself. First established in early 2003, PRTs consisted of 60 to 100 soldiers plus, eventually, Afghan advisors and representatives from civilian agencies like the US State Department, the US Agency for International Development, and the US Department of Agriculture. PRTs have the potential to become a model for future stabilization and reconstruction operations. Representatives from more than a dozen countries are now participating in 22 PRTs to enhance security, reconstruction, and the reach of the Afghan central government. PRTs have achieved great success in building support for the US-led coalition and respect for the Afghan government. They have played important roles in everything from election support to school-building to disarmament to mediating factional conflicts. Despite their potential and record of success, however, PRTs always have been a bit of a muddle. Inconsistent mission statements, unclear roles and responsibilities, ad hoc preparation, and, most important, limited resources have confused potential partners and prevented PRTs from having a greater effect on Afghanistan's future. (2) This article will first review the strategic context in which PRTs operate, namely stabilization and reconstruction operations. Second, it will describe the PRT concept and its history. Third, the article will assess the success of the PRTs against three criteria: coordination, relationship-building, and capacity-building. Enhancing local security is also a key measure of success, but as this article will discuss, PRTs achieve this goal primarily through their relationships and capacity-building efforts. The assessments in this article are based only on broad observations and discussions. They are not meant as definitive judgments but rather as a starting point for thinking about how to make such assessments more rigorous in the future. Finally, the article will conclude with some recommendations for how the PRTs should evolve in Afghanistan and how the PRTs can be a model for future operations. Stabilization and Reconstruction The US Marine Corps' draft Small Wars manual observes: Military planners might choose to consider the initial conventional combat phase as the shaping phase, rather than the decisive phase.... [I]f our political objectives can only be accomplished after a successful stability phase, then the stability phase is, de facto, the decisive (3) Events in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate that the stability phase of war is often more challenging than the combat phase. America's inability to achieve its goals in both countries more quickly has sparked much-needed debates about how America and the world should prepare for and conduct stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities. …

: The United States, Canada, and Mexico share significant concerns regarding hemispheric security. Historically, the United States and Canada have had a strong military relationship through NORAD. However, past U.S. intervention in Latin America has at times produced strained U.S.-Mexico relations. Despite past disagreements, all three countries have an interest in a multinational security organization. The U.S. Northern Command should be structured to lead both military and civilian agencies in the security realm. The command should be comprised of a multinational naval task force and a civilian border enforcement team. For legal and political reasons, leadership in the organization should have both civilian and military expertise. Specifically, the U.S. Coast Guard provides the right mix of expertise. Canadian and Mexican leaders must have leadership roles for the organization to be a true partnership, and information sharing between all countries will be necessary for the organization to be an effect defense against terrorist activities in North America.

: In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) organized crime has virtually taken control of the State. The resultant impact has been the paralysis of democratic development alienation of ordinary citizens and correspondingly the failure and distrust of the state legal and security services in a region that is already extremely unstable. The degradation of state institutions (especially police and judiciary) a breakdown in law and order and a loss public confidence in the government are symptomatic of conditions we have seen in other parts of the region and the world that have lead to state failure. As the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent actions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom have shown the U.S. and consequently the geographic combatant commander can ill afford to ignore distressed or tailing states. For the combatant commander a new staff organization called the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) provides him with an additional tool or means to influence actions not normally associated with traditional military functions. Designed to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies in order to improve planning and coordination primarily to combat terrorism, the make-up and focus of the JIACG is optimally positioned to address the issue of organized crime's destabilizing influence on FYROM. This paper examines the role of the US European Command (USEUCOM) JIACG in mitigating the risk for the commander of potential state failure in FYROM as a result of the destabilizing influence of organized crime on its government and society.

The foreign military relations of Thailand and the Philippines are analysed against a hypothesis of military dependency. Attempts by both countries to diversify their military supplies have so far not had any significant effects. Both countries are highly dependent especially upon the US. Their individual profiles differ, however. Thailand has received more US security assistance than has the Philippines. At the same time the Philippines has been financially favored by way of relatively more grant assistance and financial support. The main explanation given is that this is a way for the US to 'pay for' the base rights. This direct linkage between the US bases and assistance might be a complicating factor in the negotiations concerning the future of the bases. A 'compromise' rather than a 'refusal' policy is therefore seen as the most likely outcome for the near future after 1991 In the long run, however, several factors become important, such as the development of national and international tension, war, and the possible creation of 'cooperative forces' between the US and Third World countries. US training support might in the long run become one of the most important factors shaping future military dependency upon the US and of keeping security perceptions in these countries 'aligned' with American interpretations. This will put severe stress particularly upon those governments trying to change their defense policy away from foreign military dependency.